A model was developed and a static game of complete information was applied in an examination of a married couple's reciprocal relationship. Each chose best strategies (i.e., optimal responses) to maximize payoffs (i.e., happiness). Theoretical analysis suggests that the couple's happiness is endogenously and positively correlated and simultaneously determined. If the wife (or the husband) is not happy with the relationship, it is impossible for the husband (or the wife) to be happy with the relationship.
Introduction
The economics literature is replete with studies relating to marriage. For example, Becker's altruist model (1974 [1] , 1991 [2] ) looked at how resources are distributed within the family. The bargaining models found in cooperative game theory investigate how husband and wife bargain for a final allocation, with an outside threat point provided by divorce (e.g., Manser and Brown, 1980 [3] ; McElroy and Horney, 1981 [4] ; McElroy, 1990 [5] ; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993 [6] ). The threat point in the separate spheres bargaining model of Lundberg and Pollak (1993) [6] is internal to the marriage rather than external, as in the divorce-threat bargaining models (Manser and Brown, 1980 [3] ; McElroy and Horney, 1981 [4] ). The non-cooperative models examine how each spouse voluntarily provides household public goods, choosing actions that are utility-maximizing given the actions of their partner, and the two settle on a Nash equilibrium (e.g., Lundberg and Pollak, 1994 [7] ). Recently, the two-stage models were used to investigate a couple's decision that affects future bargaining power. For example, Lundberg and Pollak (2003) [8] analyze the two-earner-couple location game. The first stage determines whether the couple remains together, while the second stage determines their location within the marriage. Pollak (2005) [9] argues that wage rates, not earnings, determines bargaining power in marriage. Therefore, in a bargaining model with household production, the main source of bargaining power in marriage is a spouse's productivity in home production.
In this paper, we adopt an alternative approach and focus on a different perspective by applying a static game of complete information to analyze how a married couple builds a reciprocal relationship and to determine the Nash equilibrium..
The Reciprocal Relationship Model
Consider a married couple who are economic individuals and wish to have a successful marriage. Success depends on how each spouse develops their reciprocal relationship. Without a wife, a husband cannot independently produce a reciprocal relationship. Similarly, without a husband, a wife also cannot independently produce a reciprocal relationship. Thus, the reciprocal relationship must be produced by both the husband (denoted as h) and the wife (denoted as w) jointly and simultaneously. Further, it is primarily based on the husband's response to his wife (denoted h ) and the wife's response to her husband (denoted w r ). Assuming that both responses ( and ) can be quantified as a numerical scale
The higher scale of h or w indicates a more loving response from one to the other, and vice versa. The worst response is scaled as 0, which means that the response can destroy the relationship completely.
R r
We assume that the output function of the reciprocal relationship, , may be displayed in the Cobb-Douglas form: 
, the relationship output will be zero, implying that the marriage will be completely destroyed. The CobbDouglas form satisfies the assumption, so it is the most appropriate form for displaying the reciprocal relationship. The CES and linear forms cannot satisfy the assumption. Thereby, the Cobb-Douglas form is selected.
Additionally, both have expectation costs of responses. When the one lovingly responds to the other, one would expect an equally nice or better response from the other. If not, one may become frustrated. Thus, as long as there is an expectation, there is a cost from the expectation. The higher the expectation is, the higher the cost is. Therefore, the husband's expectation cost of response is illustrated as below:
where is the husband's marginal cost of response. Meanwhile, the wife's expectation cost of response is written as:
where is the wife's marginal cost of response. A higher marginal cost of response implies that the person may be more sensitive to responses and hence has higher expectations.
0,
Moreover, each one has his/her own payoff from producing the relationship. The husband's payoff   h  is specified as below:
The wife's payoff is illustrated as below:
The payoffs are not monetary. Rather, they indicate a person's happiness and/or well-being (i.e., utility). The relationship output  hw , shown in Equation (1), is produced both jointly and simultaneously, so their output functions must be the same. Hence, expectation costs are the only difference between their payoff functions. 
The Nash Equilibrium
Both the husband and the wife are economic individuals and thus seek to receive their best payoffs. Therefore, both will play the game and choose their best strategies in order to receive their best payoffs. The husband seeks great "happiness" from his wife by producing the relationship. The wife also seeks great "happiness" from her husband by producing the relationship. Both players simultaneously choose actions. In other words, this game may be viewed as a static game of complete information (i.e., a simultaneous-move game).
In the game, both players choose their best strategies, which are their responses (i.e., h and w ). In the model, the strategies available to each player are their individual responses. As we assumed earlier, response may be quantified according to a numerical scale; thus, the numerical scale is continuously divisible and the negative scale is not feasible. Hence, each player's strategy space is identified as , the nonnegative real numbers, in which a typical strategy s is a numerical scale choice of response, . However, we assume that an extremely large numerical scale of response (i.e., 
The first-order condition for the husband's optimization problem is both necessary and sufficient; it yields:
Similarly, for the wife, solves: 
  is to be onse c a Nash equilibrium, the players' resp hoices must satisfy both Equations (6) and (7). To solve Equations (6) and (7), substituting Equation (7) into Equation (6) yields Equation (8) , and substituting Equation (8) into Equation (7) yields Equation (9) . Hence, they are:
The numerical scale of response pair is the N s ( As shown in Equation (9), 0 Proof:
l numeric
As sho n i w n Equations (8) and (9) ife. This nd would play a more important role than the wife in the process of producing the relationship. For that reason, Proposition 3 indicatesthat if the husband's relationship demand is more elastic than the wife's, the husband would likely want to take on more responsibilities in the process. Therefore, the husband will offer more loving response than the wife's in producing the relationship, vice versa. 
Conclusion
In this paper we developed a model and applied a static game of complete information to analyze a married co pl hu n wife wish to have a successful marriage so they choose their best strategies (i.e., optimal to maxim their payoffs (i.e., happiness). B the premise that both the husband and the wife are economic individuals, the theoretical analysis suggests that the hus-'s happiness are endogenously and 
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